Tag: zero interest rates

11. The Latest Rise in the Price of Gold – a New Cause for Concern

Posted on by Ana Nives Radovic

While the price of gold continues to rise it is a sign that financial resources should be turned into gold, opening the question about the latest causes of this phenomenon and whether gold really still has the status of a “safe haven” investment.

This month’s trading on the global financial market was under the impact of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, who dismissed the director of the FBI. An ongoing investigation could lead to the opening of an exclusion procedure. This unavoidably had an impact on the value of the American dollar, moving investors to other assets.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the start of the monetary downturn from the European Central Bank, their decision not to add 80 billion euros every month but to reduce it to 60 billion monthly. The expectation that this situation will not be something that the banks in the Eurozone will be willing to accustom easily tempted a bigger awareness of the stock market, which so far has been pulled up mostly by banking shares.

Both of these situations have caused the rise in the price of gold. Besides that, two big countries, Russia and China, are the leading global importers of this precious metal and they are making efforts to arrange a new global financial system that is supposed to be completely autonomous and detached from the dollar.

The first half of 2017 was marked by several serious political events, including some of the most critical elections in the Netherlands and France. There are odds-on chances that the financial world is relatively distressed with the apparent outcome of a renewed demand for safe assets, where gold takes first place.

Another thing is that since 2015, the Chinese yuan is incorporated into its official reserves of the Central Bank of Russia, announced for the first time to have integrated, which until that time consisted of 44 percent of dollars, 42 percent euros, and a bit more than nine percent of pounds sterling.

At this time, China and Russia are increasing their gold reserves considerably, making an allowance for a progressively strict way of monetizing gold as the foremost mechanism of trade arrangement, particularly through their currencies now held up by gold and also within the structure of an exchange system analogous to that of the rest of the world still locked by a declining dollar.

Last year at the same time, demand for gold, supported by purchases of exchange-traded funds, was exceptional. With the uncertainties generated by the prospect of a possible Brexit, investors had massively taken refuge in the gold contracts during the first quarter of 2016.

Global gold demand continued to grow in the second quarter of 2016, marked by the deepening crisis with Brexit and worsening geopolitical factors by 15 percent. Demand for gold reached 1,290 tons in the first quarter of 2016, an increase of 21 percent compared to the first quarter of 2015, making it the second-largest quarter in terms of demand.

The price of gold has even augmented by 25 percent in this first half of the year, which represents its highest performance for more than 35 years, while on a twelve-monthly basis, global demand for gold fell by 18 percent, a plunge to be put into perspective given the exceptional demand last year, evoking that the first three months of 2016 correspond to the strongest first quarter ever in terms of demand. Gold demand, with a total of 1064 tons, reached a new record in the first half of 2016, surpassing the previous peak by 16 percent in 2009 that was present in the peak of the global financial crisis.

When it comes to the strongest political impacts on the global financial market, it was the election of Trump that pushed investors into a short-lived optimism. Regardless of the prospect of a stronger dollar and a rise in U.S. interest rates, there is still vagueness at the global level today, both economically and geopolitically.

Central banks remained strong buyers, buying 109 tons in the first quarter, while the supply increased by five percent. This increase was fueled by a massive influx of 364 tons of gold-traded funds, reflecting a huge escape from currencies into gold, since market participants are concerned about the global economy. Also, investment was the largest component of the demand for gold for two consecutive quarters.

There are two possible outcomes of the current situation, where the first one is reaching the global agreement to maintain the dollar’s status as the world currency, while the other one is related to manipulation with the price of gold. The global agreement is related to upholding the value of the dollar. Since the macroeconomic data of the United States are showing a decline from quarter to quarter, the dollar is no longer used as much in everyday life around the world. The central financial institution in the U.S. Federal Reserve continues the trend of printing money, opening the space for the deficit that became unmanageable. This made investors recognize that they have to look for alternatives to the green currency.

On the other hand, finding alternatives is not something that banks cannot practice. In this regard, the setback comes from the investment banks, creators of the gold and silver markets and its agents, which are looking for a particular advantage at the cost of investors, as it was the situation in the past. This is obtainable by spreading panic and transferring funds to others so they can take advantage of the upbeat period until the next similar occasion.

As this has happened several times during the past decades, those were the emerging countries, in particular China and Russia, that have benefited from buying gold at artificially low prices, expressed by all these manipulations, which explains the shortage of this precious metal, particularly because Chinese buyers do not return it to the market.

At the same time, it is Germany that does not consider publicly the fact that its gold is stored in the United States could be sold and therefore there is no asking for its repatriation. This is why this enthusiastic phase would last for a certain time based on the correction where the potential is considerable for the emerging countries to make further movements to not be allied to the dollar.

This article is part of the academic publication Dividing by Zero by Ana Nives Radovic, Global Knowledge 2018

9. ECB Is Hiding Public Debt Instead of Stimulating Growth

Posted on by Ana Nives Radovic

The European Central Bank has injected huge amounts of assets into the economy over the past two years in the course of rediscounting public debt of the Eurozone countries, which represents an exceptional monetary measure, referred to as quantitative easing is intended to bring back the rise of the inflation rate, which is itself supposed to neutralize the deflationary and recessionary forces that are affecting development.

While, in the beginning, the single European currency was weighed down by the proclamation of new measures to support the European economy, it has recovered against the dollar once the ECB suggested that a descent in interest rates should not necessarily continue for the foreseeable outlook. At that moment, investors began to distrust the efficiency of the monetary policy of the ECB and were increasingly worried about the collapse of solutions. The hope expressed by its leaders that rates should not go lower is not something that could restore their confidence. Subsequently, the dollar plunged to the lowest level since mid-February against the single European currency.

This situation emerged when the recession started to put pressure on interest rates, as investment requirements were extremely low, causing the quantity of money borrowed to fall by diminishing the interest rate. Following this, the ECB announced that it would lower its major interest rate to zero with the plan of infusing inflation and increasing growth.

These conditions have caused the creation of three major problems. Firstly, even though the ECB lowered rates, the growth of the inflation rate did not return. Secondly, the euro lost its value because there was plenty of ready-to-use money in the financial sector of the Eurozone. Thirdly, there was an increase in public debt, as it served as security for the money produced.

Furthermore, all of the liquidity boosters made the euro more plentiful, decreasing its value, primarily against the dollar. This caused it to become cheaper in terms of interest rates, while on the other side, these financial actions constituted access to the unsound environment of public debt. Conversely, any downgrading of the green currency makes dollar purchases of gold less expensive for traders with other currencies. This is a trend expected to uphold the price of gold, which also benefits from its category as a safe haven, boosted by these circumstances.

Without the refinancing of the ECB, this kind of debt would have suppressed the economy by collecting the money of individuals and companies through the balance sheets of banks and insurance companies. So, Eurozone countries found willing creditors for their refinancing at zero or even negative rates.

However, the two key features of this kind of indebtedness are that the total amount is equal to the aggregate of the sums borrowed by the country and the interest on the debt that the government has agreed to pay. On the surface, one might conclude that it is acceptable to practice financing by debt, though in this case, without bearing the burden of salaries. To repay this debt, the state has only one option: to charge a tax by forcing taxpayers to pay it, which also has its particular cost.

In cases where the central bank lends money to the government at a zero rate, the central bank makes pure monetary creation since it does not pay off. This creates market tension, especially due to the growing complexity of the repayment of the debt reinforcing the distrust of depositors.

The only subject in the Eurozone that has the privilege of monetary creation is the ECB, although the Treaty of Lisbon bans lending directly to the states. It explains that it might mean rescuing the countries that would be those who receive the money from other members at their own cost, as well as to avoid causing inflation. Consequently, those would be the Eurozone members that agreed to the massiveness of their public debts, slightly in the form of deposits made with credits where other members act as lenders.

The situation as such would generate an extremely high inflation rate. Besides that, there would be strong tensions on interest rates or stimulated outcomes that would further increase it, creating an environment completely insupportable, both for households and companies. It would strongly affect the poorest ones, as well as inflict a heavy blow on the middle class, whose purchasing power would decrease so rapidly that the income tax would be impossible to collect in the amount planned by the yearly budget.

These were the reasons why monetary creation was presented as required. However, it is inadequate to stimulate growth and inflation this way because its actual purpose is to hide public debt in the balance sheet of the ECB through insignificant interest rates. Besides that, these are the banks that make this possible through very low or zero interest rates, and whose savings will ultimately be cut off by inflation.

European contracts do not allow the ECB to buy new debts issued by Eurozone members. It could only purchase them on the secondary market, using existing savings rather than printing new money out of nothing. However, such public debts stay in proper balance sheets only as much as it is required to relocate newly issued money through the quantitative easing program, which made these public debts replaced by nonexistent monetary assets.

All of this is a subject of financial authoritarianism, representing a situation that leads to recession and a struggle against debt repayment. Financial repression is a context characterized by artificially low rates to reduce the burden of the public debt burden.

This article is part of the academic publication Dividing by Zero by Ana Nives Radovic, Global Knowledge 2018

6. Zero Rates – a Symbol of Inefficiency and Nonsense

Posted on by Ana Nives Radovic

The decision of the European Central Bank to keep interest rates during 2017 in Eurozone under their historical minimum, with the key reference rate at zero, as well as to leave their substantial public and private debts accumulated since 2015 operational was followed by this institution’s decision to leave the marginal lending rate at 0.25 percent, allowing banks to borrow for 24 hours.

The assertion has been made that, with prevailing zero interest rates, banks gain the capability to self-fund at no cost from the European Central Bank (ECB). Consequently, banks are expected to reduce the rates they impose on customers who are indebted to them. The ECB’s historically low rates exert an automatic impact on short-term savings. As banks cannot afford to disburse substantial amounts in cash, they are constrained in lending at favorable rates without compromising their profit margins.

The ECB recently unveiled a series of monetary policy measures, including a reduction in its central rate to zero for the first time in its history and the introduction of an extended long-term loan facility for banks. The initial phase of this plan has unfolded mostly as intended. However, since the implementation of the ECB’s financial strategy, citizens across the Eurozone have observed a decline in average salaries.

In essence, when the ECB lowers its interest rate, it aims to stimulate credit activities and consequently boost investment. Conversely, an increase in the interest rate signifies a tangible risk of inflation, where an excess of cash circulates while prices surge rapidly, necessitating proactive management of the situation. In the current scenario, a political risk emerges as a primary challenge for the year. The ECB authorities are acutely aware of this and are prepared to take necessary measures to prevent market upheaval, even if their actions may exacerbate the situation.

While there are no imminent announcements of new decisions regarding interest rates, the initiation of monetary contraction seems untimely, especially considering upcoming key elections in various countries and a backdrop of escalating populist movements. The ECB is understandably reluctant to face additional uncertainties.

Given the ECB’s investment in short-term products, it is the capital that is predominantly affected by the zero rates, particularly commercial paper issued by corporations. Prolonged stagnation refers to a situation of feeble growth characterized by persistently low, or even zero, interest rates. Currently, there is a recovery of growth and inflation in progress. The demand deficit is not insurmountable, and as additional savings are anticipated to be reinvested, efficiency is expected to rise.

To address these economic dynamics, the ECB has opted to initiate an extensive asset purchase program, surpassing previous initiatives. The Quantitative Easing program, initiated in March 2015, involved monthly purchases of private and public bond securities on the secondary market totaling 60 billion euros. This decision was prompted by the collapse of inflation and the looming risks of deflation in the Eurozone. Furthermore, zero and especially negative interest rates are symbolic of absurdity, as zero in a range of values conveys the message that no other points exist.

Overnight deposit rates, which entered negative territory for the first time in June 2014, were maintained at -0.4% and strengthened last month, transitioning from -0.3% to -0.4%. A negative rate is intended to encourage banks not to leave excess money with the central bank but to lend it to their clients. This implies that banks have to pay a fee to the ECB for surplus cash held for 24 hours. There are significant differences in assets between rates ranging from one to five percent compared to those ranging from zero to one percent. The zero point is primarily due to the impossibility of dividing any number by zero.

In practical terms, a rate of 0% theoretically allows an economic agent to borrow an unlimited sum at zero cost. The zero point suggests a perception of unwarranted action, contributing to a substantial psychological aspect visible in investors’ behavior. The decline in borrowing rates used by the state directly impacts the income from funds on life insurance contracts, mainly composed of government bonds.

During times when the outcome is rounded, as insurance companies maintain debt securities acquired several years ago higher than newly issued debt, the ECB introduced a scheme where the threat becomes zero or unreal, and where the time value is zero. However, time does have value, demonstrated through scoring, distance, and its scarcity. Depository banks also increased their debt repurchase volume from 20 billion euros per month to 80 billion, extending the scope of qualified securities for these procedures.

There is no visible proof that the ECB’s aims, whether inflation targeted at the rate of two percent or economic growth in the Eurozone, have been realized. This economic oddity has never been adequately explained in economic theory. Simultaneously, the ECB strengthened its comprehensive debt exchange program, distributing 1,740 billion euros over two years. The range of securities eligible for debt repurchase has been expanded to include bonds issued by corporations in the Eurozone, excluding banks.

Recent increases in prices are primarily attributed to rising oil prices, significantly lower at the beginning of last year, and an increase in food prices, especially fruits and vegetables, caused by a harsh winter in southern European countries. Considering unpredictable elements, such as inflation generated by wage increases, will prevent it from remaining too low to account for any monetary contraction. However, as is often the case, common sense reminds us that when a strategy does not work, it is because the institutions have not done enough.

Securities purchased through the QE program may have a maturity of up to thirty years, arranged under a rule of proportionality to each government’s involvement in the ECB scheme. The securities purchasing practice should not encourage governments to lack fiscal discipline. All the procedures announced last month surpassed market expectations, which were anticipating increased debt repurchases and a decline in the deposit rate.

In this process, liquidity increases by 1000 in cash to continue playing, banks recover their positions completely, and the ECB recovers the decomposed risk and the risk of default. This is how billions of euros are being created fictitiously. In exchange for the debt held by various banks, the ECB simply credits its bank account with 1000 through a notional inscription of 1000 more.

This situation suggests that only this type of investment is supposed to be made hypothetically in an adjustable monetary policy. It has generated an influx of ready money invested in various shares, somewhat resembling fiscal deficits intended to enhance growth. When there was no visible growth, the deficits were not high enough, similar to the refinancing rate, which applies when a bank requires daily liquidity, unlike the refinancing rate, which is weekly.

The ECB managed the purchases of securities within the limits specified by the central banks of Eurozone members, covering 20 percent of the risk under the cohesion principle, with the rest under the responsibility of each central bank. Projected low rates were meant to encourage investments, stimulating growth based on positive actions by businesses and subsequently their stock market appraisal. In February 2017, for the first time in four years, inflation reached the targeted rate of two percent, surpassing the ECB’s target of a slightly lower price boost. At the same time, the Eurozone economy showed certain signs of strengthening.

A crossroads in the ECB’s position is not anticipated before the meeting expected in June. This allows enough time for opponents of the current ECB policy to propose alternative solutions that would stimulate lending, investments, and growth rather than zero rates that produce fictive results.

This article is part of the academic publication Dividing by Zero by Ana Nives Radovic, Global Knowledge 2018