Tag: quantitative easing

9. ECB Is Hiding Public Debt Instead of Stimulating Growth

Posted on by Ana Nives Radovic

The European Central Bank has injected huge amounts of assets into the economy over the past two years in the course of rediscounting public debt of the Eurozone countries, which represents an exceptional monetary measure, referred to as quantitative easing is intended to bring back the rise of the inflation rate, which is itself supposed to neutralize the deflationary and recessionary forces that are affecting development.

While, in the beginning, the single European currency was weighed down by the proclamation of new measures to support the European economy, it has recovered against the dollar once the ECB suggested that a descent in interest rates should not necessarily continue for the foreseeable outlook. At that moment, investors began to distrust the efficiency of the monetary policy of the ECB and were increasingly worried about the collapse of solutions. The hope expressed by its leaders that rates should not go lower is not something that could restore their confidence. Subsequently, the dollar plunged to the lowest level since mid-February against the single European currency.

This situation emerged when the recession started to put pressure on interest rates, as investment requirements were extremely low, causing the quantity of money borrowed to fall by diminishing the interest rate. Following this, the ECB announced that it would lower its major interest rate to zero with the plan of infusing inflation and increasing growth.

These conditions have caused the creation of three major problems. Firstly, even though the ECB lowered rates, the growth of the inflation rate did not return. Secondly, the euro lost its value because there was plenty of ready-to-use money in the financial sector of the Eurozone. Thirdly, there was an increase in public debt, as it served as security for the money produced.

Furthermore, all of the liquidity boosters made the euro more plentiful, decreasing its value, primarily against the dollar. This caused it to become cheaper in terms of interest rates, while on the other side, these financial actions constituted access to the unsound environment of public debt. Conversely, any downgrading of the green currency makes dollar purchases of gold less expensive for traders with other currencies. This is a trend expected to uphold the price of gold, which also benefits from its category as a safe haven, boosted by these circumstances.

Without the refinancing of the ECB, this kind of debt would have suppressed the economy by collecting the money of individuals and companies through the balance sheets of banks and insurance companies. So, Eurozone countries found willing creditors for their refinancing at zero or even negative rates.

However, the two key features of this kind of indebtedness are that the total amount is equal to the aggregate of the sums borrowed by the country and the interest on the debt that the government has agreed to pay. On the surface, one might conclude that it is acceptable to practice financing by debt, though in this case, without bearing the burden of salaries. To repay this debt, the state has only one option: to charge a tax by forcing taxpayers to pay it, which also has its particular cost.

In cases where the central bank lends money to the government at a zero rate, the central bank makes pure monetary creation since it does not pay off. This creates market tension, especially due to the growing complexity of the repayment of the debt reinforcing the distrust of depositors.

The only subject in the Eurozone that has the privilege of monetary creation is the ECB, although the Treaty of Lisbon bans lending directly to the states. It explains that it might mean rescuing the countries that would be those who receive the money from other members at their own cost, as well as to avoid causing inflation. Consequently, those would be the Eurozone members that agreed to the massiveness of their public debts, slightly in the form of deposits made with credits where other members act as lenders.

The situation as such would generate an extremely high inflation rate. Besides that, there would be strong tensions on interest rates or stimulated outcomes that would further increase it, creating an environment completely insupportable, both for households and companies. It would strongly affect the poorest ones, as well as inflict a heavy blow on the middle class, whose purchasing power would decrease so rapidly that the income tax would be impossible to collect in the amount planned by the yearly budget.

These were the reasons why monetary creation was presented as required. However, it is inadequate to stimulate growth and inflation this way because its actual purpose is to hide public debt in the balance sheet of the ECB through insignificant interest rates. Besides that, these are the banks that make this possible through very low or zero interest rates, and whose savings will ultimately be cut off by inflation.

European contracts do not allow the ECB to buy new debts issued by Eurozone members. It could only purchase them on the secondary market, using existing savings rather than printing new money out of nothing. However, such public debts stay in proper balance sheets only as much as it is required to relocate newly issued money through the quantitative easing program, which made these public debts replaced by nonexistent monetary assets.

All of this is a subject of financial authoritarianism, representing a situation that leads to recession and a struggle against debt repayment. Financial repression is a context characterized by artificially low rates to reduce the burden of the public debt burden.

This article is part of the academic publication Dividing by Zero by Ana Nives Radovic, Global Knowledge 2018

7. When a Rescue Plan is an Obstacle to Recovery

Posted on by Ana Nives Radovic

The decision of the European Central Bank to keep interest rates during 2017 in the Eurozone under their historical minimum, with the key reference rate at zero, as well as to leave their substantial public and private debts accumulated since 2015 operational was followed by this institution’s decision to leave the marginal lending rate at 0.25 percent, allowing banks to borrow for 24 hours.

The central financial institution of the United States, the Federal Reserve, directs global finance, as well as a significant portion of the global economy. This is the reason why financial markets worldwide seemingly reflect unreservedly qualified prices, as they are entirely under the Fed’s control.

The highest position in the Fed’s regulatory system is the way it controls access to the American dollar, as currency is nothing more than credit. Therefore, money has become nothing more than an additional alarming factor in the flow. In processes such as these, ready money is guaranteed by the government, while credit is guaranteed by the banks. Hence, the Fed regulates the price of credit by setting the policy rate, and banks, Wall Street, and financial markets depend on these proceedings.

The regulations of the Dodd-Frank Act have altered their way of functioning, resulting in certain very specific changes. The Dodd-Frank Act, adopted after the 2008 financial crisis, aims to enforce capital inflow and annual stress tests on large banks. These tests are conducted to prevent risks to the global financial system by ensuring that these banks can withstand financial shocks. However, this act is currently under disapproval from the new American administration, which condemns the banking business guidelines it imposes.

President of the U.S., Donald Trump, stated that he hopes his administration will significantly reduce Dodd-Frank’s regulations because “some of his friends with beautiful companies cannot borrow money”. He explained that banks do not want to lend them money “because of the rules of the Dodd-Frank law”.

The entire process represents a significant challenge. Although the current administration does not have a strong stance on many of these issues, apart from trade and overcoming the Dodd-Frank Act on financial regulation, there is still a chance to achieve a compromise. The Dodd-Frank Act, on the contrary, provides a comprehensive framework that allows the Securities Exchange Commission and its commodity equivalent, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, to assume responsibility for these financial instruments.

Since Trump became president and began talking about deregulation, the shares of the six major banks saw their prices rise by more than a third, led by the Bank of America with a spectacular 48.8% increase in one quarter. The exceptional debt of U.S. non-financial corporations rose to more than 13 trillion dollars, including around $3 trillion in debt since this act was passed in July 2010, though not all of it comes from bank loans.

As the Fed has trimmed interest rates to zero, the cost of borrowing has become extremely low in the capital markets. This situation encourages the use of ready money available. However, even if some of these debts come from the bond market, the guarantee of the debt itself is often controlled by the biggest banks.

There are several things that occurred this month that lead to wrong conclusions regarding plans of Trump’s administration. It does not act like a nation-state and is unwilling to correct its own mistakes, creating an apprehension of huge self-destruction. There is also a fear that, as is the case in many other developed countries, the middle class will be further downgraded, especially because growth is based on indebtedness. Thus, only credit sellers see the benefits of such “potential” where thousands of billions have been unsuccessfully redistributed.

From the Fed’s standpoint, there is a change in approach where, instead of using speed-up tools to stimulate the economy, they now let it step up, limiting it to the point where it completely holds up the accelerator. This practice still allows a sufficient amount of control, as well as the possibility to exploit market potential to strengthen the financial sector rather than truly stimulating growth. It is yet unclear at what phase of this process the American economy is at the moment, but it unquestionably took one more step towards the ultimate devastation when it started to practice Quantitative Easing programs and everything that was later meant to be the substitute.

The situation after those programs ended was led with a fictive increase in interest rates, which has caused even more confusion since the lower the rate, the more credit is available, while at times of higher rates, less ready money is available, allowing only banks to recover. These credits were primarily given to institutions significant for Fed’s success, combining the policies of the U.S. government and the leading banks, who then redistribute it to their partners at higher or lower prices, such as multinational corporations with top credit ratings, oil producers, other banks, and other governments, etc.

In a situation where Congress is not in a position to balance the budget or cut spending substantially, it is not even possible for the Fed to let monetary policy return to standard, since a huge amount of artificial credit facilitated by this monetary system flooded all tools of regulations, making them dysfunctional. Years of development of a financial system as such allowed cheap credit to go first to those with debt capabilities, such as the richest subjects, big corporations, and Wall Street magnates, instead of to those whose wealth stimulates spending, i.e. consumers. Since an average worker gives one hour of their limited time, where only 25 dollars could be brought, while a Wall Street insider could get unlimited credit at a price that is under the actual rate of inflation.

A huge concentration of these credits made them become bad debts which have a significant reflection on the Fed’s balance sheet. To solve that problem, there is a thought that they should be put back on the market, which created a remarkable concern since the collection of credit up to that point grew relatively fast. In the situation where the Fed revisits debt selling, it continues in return for the money, and therefore the amount of credit or currency diminishes instead of growing constantly. By doing so, the Fed risks the explosion of the bond bubble, as there will be fewer buyers for bonds so rates will go up.

One of the key arguments that Trump’s administration suggests is withdrawing all or part of the Dodd-Frank Act, besides the fact that it was created by the administration of Barack Obama is that it reduces bank loans. For the current American administration, this represents an obstacle to economic recovery. According to the Fed, all loans and leases over the last three years granted by US banks increased by 6.9 percent each year, while during seven years before the crisis, that rate was 7.9 percent. The central U.S. financial institution still preserves the option to restore a possibility for monetary discourse, indirectly showing that it will never take a chance of disturbing the markets.

There are several implications of such policies on the current financial policies of the U.S. that reflect on other central banks worldwide. One implication is that banks lent the companies about 80 billion dollars every year, where corporations had approximately two billion dollars of ready money that they could use to expand employment or growth. However, instead, they borrowed larger amounts of money than ever to convert their shares or to reimburse dividends. During this process, companies supported by banks disfigured the market equity by not allowing it to boost through actual investment or reasonable assessment of their companies.

Conditionally, and if the Fed keeps on with these policies, the equity markets will witness distractions, since there are many cases where trading items have seen an upward march. While reforms and major investments are slow to occur, they could take the threats very seriously. There is also a fear about the decline of many debt-dependent economies, keeping in mind that central banks have established themselves as major consumers of all kinds of bonds, but also as backers of available credit, both for the business sector and for governments. So, if they give up this position, the whole situation will be very difficult.

Besides that, banks involved in this process are mandatory to maintain an assured quantity of reserve requirements with the Fed. Having in mind that the quantity of reserves deposited with the central bank of the U.S. was close to the required reserves, but since the 2008 crisis, the amount of reserves overload deposited has reduced and it now stands at around two billion dollars. This means that it is not the Fed regulations on minimum reserves that bound bank lending, but that those are the banks that are limiting themselves because they fear future defaults.

This means that the Fed no longer performs quantitative easing officially in terms of not printing money to buy Treasury bills. However in reality, when a requirement it holds matures, they are buying another to roll the debt. Therefore, the Fed can reduce its financial statement, since its balance sheet would be subject to easier regulation. For the current U.S. administration, that is not a satisfying outlook because the Fed was certainly a shock absorber regarding its purchase of Treasury bills at times when the government became dependent on borrowing.

Another thing is that Fed figures demonstrate that business lending action has been stronger than it was supposed to be and that is why it is beginning to weaken. There was an immense credit spreading-out cycle with low-priced money created by central banks and ultra-accommodative monetary policies. However, the failures to pay and complexities in the credit sector were increasing.

At this moment, it is Trump’s administration that could relieve tension by transferring supremacy and money from one section to another. This, of course, would not be sufficient to change the system, and neither the Congress nor the Fed could stop the credit cycle at this moment. Unlike actual money, borrowed money is subject to the credit cycle that causes its boosts and falls. At times when the reduction is acceptable, the whole system is under threat.

This article is part of the academic publication Dividing by Zero by Ana Nives Radovic, Global Knowledge 2018

2. The Danger Zone – Where Nominal Yields Do Not Effectively Reimburse the Risk of Collapse

Posted on by Ana Nives Radovic

From a certain point that the markets have already achieved, banks will no longer be capable to boost credit amount to reimburse for losses from their central bank, which might clarify the disintegration of the banking sector.

The phenomenon of negative interest rates embodies an inverted structure wherein the borrower deducts a calculated amount, based on the agreed-upon rate, from the owed sum. This results in a scenario where the more one borrows, the less one repays.

A discernible threat accompanies the rise of negative interest rates, particularly evident in Europe, as it poses a risk to financial independence and economic expectations.

After maintaining its rate at nearly zero for over seven years, the Federal Reserve of the United States announced its first increase in December 2015. Since then, global markets have entered a new era of monetary policy, characterized by exceptional measures adopted by almost all central banks worldwide in response to the previous decade’s financial crisis.

The looming question revolves around whether this upward trajectory will impede the slow economic recovery. Financial and economic entities have grown reliant on easy money, and uncertainties persist regarding their ability to adapt to higher rates. Hence, observers anxiously attempt to discern the potential outcomes by year-end.

In many global markets, especially in Europe, central banks are adopting a reverse trend, implementing a negative interest rate policy for the first time.

The gradual decline in interest rates has taken on a new dimension, enabling numerous countries to reduce their indebtedness. The injection of free liquidity into banks serves as a lifeline for governments. In the case of the European Central Bank, the objective is clear: infuse money into the financial system, fostering a more considerate approach toward indebted countries.

National central banks, expanding their balance sheets by purchasing lower-rated bank debt, inundate financial institutions with free money. However, these institutions, seeking yields, venture into the perilous territory of investing in assets where the nominal yield fails to adequately compensate for the risk of collapse.

This scheme, under ordinary circumstances, would never find traction in a financial system operating close to historical averages. Yet, with abundant liquidity awaiting investment, the hope for increased growth persists. Nonetheless, the mitigating factors fall short of eliminating the probability of a breakdown in such funds.

Moreover, the expectation that banks will offer money at lower rates for an extended period prompts them to make alternative income. Given that the interest rate is near zero, banks generate returns by lending money to others at a somewhat higher interest rate, creating a distinctive income stream.

Ordinary interest rates reflect the interplay between the present and the future, coupled with expectations of future prosperity. This dynamic explains why interest rates tend to be higher in the poorest countries, where the cost of time is minimal. On the contrary, financial interest rates, directly or indirectly influenced by central bankers, represent the cost of accessible money within a specified timeframe. Any deviation from these two scenarios is a harbinger of a crisis where money is supplied without adhering to economic principles.

Negative interest rates create a scenario wherein individuals deposit money with a bank, turning it into a cost rather than a return. In times when conventional savings show minimal gains, borrowing becomes more appealing, as the repayment amount is lower than the borrowed sum.

Consequently, traders seeking yields are compelled to explore speculative dealings and transactions related to commodities such as oil and gold. However, the overarching impact of zero or negative rates on the investment’s value contributes to the endorsement of negative rates on savings without commensurate performance. The inherent risk in banking balance sheets remains elevated, and investors, regardless of their risk aversion, are poised to bear the price of potential losses.

This article is part of the academic publication Dividing by Zero by Ana Nives Radovic, Global Knowledge 2018